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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRAN!{ TAYLOR and MARGARET ~ 
GARNER, djbja FRANK TAYLOR 
and GARNER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
-vs.-
LEE L. DAHL, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
PETER W. HUMMEL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9172 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs and by the De-
fendant Lee L. Dahl from a Summary Judgment entered 
by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on the 23rd day 
of October, 1959, (R. 29). 
This action was originally commenced by Frank 
Taylor and Margaret S. Garner, doing business as Frank 
Taylor and Garner, the Plaintiffs, against Lee L. Dahl 
and Peter W. Hummel as Defendants on the 24th day of 
February, 1959, (R. 1). Plaintiffs allege that they are 
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duly licensed real estate brokers inthe State of Utah and 
that the Plaintiffs obtained the earnest money agreement 
whi~h is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint a~d marked 
Exhibit "A," (R. 4) signed by the parties and a deposit 
:Of $10,000 ·on the purchase of the home of the Seller Lee 
L. Dahl by the Purchaser, Peter W. Hummel. The Plain-
tiffs_ al~o obtained a sales agency agreement fron1 the 
Defendant Lee L. Dahl wherein and whereby it was 
agreed that a 5!fo commission was to be paid to the Plain-
tiffs for the sale of said home. After the execution of the 
earnest-money receipt the-parties had a dispute and the 
actual transfer of property was never consun1illated. The 
Plaintiff.s did not claim the full $10,000 and in order to be 
reliev·ed of any duplicate claims tendered into Court the 
$10,000 less the real estate commission of $3,750.00, and 
by Plaintiffs' Cmnplaint sought to have the Court ad-
judicate the rights of the parties in and to the $6,250.00 
and·to award to the Plaintiffs the real estate commission 
of $3,750.00 and reasonable attorney's fees in connection 
with the action brought, (R. 1-4). The Defendant, Peter 
W. Humlnel, in answering Plaintiffs' Complaint admitted 
that the Plaintiffs were licensed brokers in the State of 
Utah; that the Defendant Dahl was a resident of Salt 
Lake County; that the Defendant Hummel was a non-
resident, but the property which was made the subject of 
the suit was within the jurisdiction of the Court, (R. 5). 
The Defendant further admitted that he had deposited 
the sum of $10,000 with the Plaintiff and that his signature 
was genuine on the earnest money receipt, (R. 5). De-
fendant Hummel further alleges that he has made de-
mand upon the Plaintiffs for the return of the full $10,000 
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which the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Lee L. Dahl have 
refused to return and admits that disputes have arisen 
between the Defendant Hummel and the Defendant Lee L. 
Dahl and generally denies Plaintiffs' Complaint except 
for asking that the full $10,000 should be returned to this 
Defendant, (R. 5-6). The Defendant Hummel then filed 
a counterclaim in which he admits that he has deposited 
with the Plaintiffs the sum of $10,000 and signed the 
earnest money agreement which is heretofore referred 
to and affirmatively alleges that that written instrument 
was uncompleted in that the agreed plans and specifica-
tions detailing the finished worked to be completed had 
not been procured, (R. 6). This Defendant further al-
leges that the deposit of the money was conditional upo:n 
the Defendant Hummel being able to procure plans and 
specifications for the work to be completed which were 
to be subject to his approval and that no approval wa8 
ever obtained from him, (R. 7). The Defendant further 
alleges that there was misrepresentations on several occa-
sions as to the square footage of the home and that upon 
learning of the misrepresentations he refused to further 
negotiate or further consumate the sale and that this 
Defendant has demanded the return of the $10,000 to 
himself, (R. 7). 
The Defendant, Lee L. Dahl, in answering Plaintiffs' 
Complaint admits that the Plaintiffs are licensed brok-
ers and that the parties are residents of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, except for the Defendant Hummel, but that the prop-
erty is within the jurisdiction of the court which is the 
subject of this law suit, and further admits that a sales 
agency agreement had been executed between the Plain-
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tiffs and this Defendant on the home which is the subject 
of this law suit, and further admits that the Plaintiffs 
obtained a purchaser for the property in the Defendant 
I-Iummel and that the Defendant Hummel deposited the 
$10,000 earnest money and that the earnest money agree-
ment was executed by the parties, (R. 9). This Defend-
ant,- Lee L. Dahl, denies that the Plaintiffs are entitled to 
a real estate commission out of the fund and that the 
Plaintiffs are entitled to any attorney's fees in connec-
tion with their action but that the money should all be 
paid over to Lee L. Dahl, (R. 10). The Defendant, Lee 
L. Dahl, then filed a counterclaim alleging that the earn-
est money agreement was entered into but that the De-
fendant Peter Hummel after the entering of the earnest 
money agreement withdrew from his contractual obliga- :J, 
tion and refused to complete the agree1nent, (R. 10-11). 
He further claims that the Plaintiffs had refused to turn 
over to this Defendant the earnest n1oney in the amount 
of $10,000 which was held in trust for the Defendant as 
liquidated damages and that by reason of the fact that 
the purchaser Peter Hummel had failed to complete the 
transaction the Plaintiffs were not entitled to their real 
estate conlillission or any of the money held by them and 
that the money should be paid over to the Defendant 
Dahl, (R. 11). The Defendant Dahl also asks for puni-
tive dan1ages against the Plaintiffs for their failure to 
turn over the money to him. 
To these Counterclaims the Plaintiffs filed an An-
swer acknowledging the execution of the docu1nents but 
denying that Plaintiffs were liable to the Defendants for 
the return of the full $10,000.00 because of Plaintiff's 
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real estate commission, (R.13-16). The Defendant Lee 
Dahl filed a cross complaint against the Defendant Peter 
Hummel, (R.17). In this cross .complaint the Defendant 
Dahl alleges that Mr. Dahl and 1\ir. Hummel entered into 
an earnest money agreement which was executed by the 
parties and that the Defendant Hummel had deposited 
as earnest money the sum of $10,000.00 to secure and 
apply to the purchase price of the property located at 
5834 Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, this being 
the property in question in the law suit. It is fur-
ther alleged that the Defendant Hummel had failed and 
refused to complete the terms of the agreement and that 
the Defendant Dahl should be entitled to the $10,000.00 
as a liquidated damage and that further because the De-
fendant Hummel had requested certain changes be made 
in the property which had been performed by the De-
fendant Dahl that the Defendant Hummel should be liable 
to the Defendant Dahl for the sum of $3,000.00 for the 
additional costs and expenses incurred and for attor-
ney's fees as prayed. 
The Defendant Hummel filed an answer to the cross 
complaint in which he denies that there had been an 
agreement entered into between the parties in that the 
agreement was not complete and that there were mis-
representations as to the property, (R. 21-23). The De-
fendant Dahl filed a reply to the answer to the cross 
complaint in which he alleges that there was no mis-
representation because the Defendant Hummel had per-
sonally inspected the property and that the agreement 
was complete between the parties, (R. 24). 
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On April 13th and 14th of 1959, depositions were 
taken of the Plaintiff Margaret S. Garner and of each 
pfthe Defendants Lee L. Dahl and Peter W. Hummel. 
These· depositions. are part of the record of this case. 
After the depositions were taken a pre-trial conference 
was held before the ::Honorable l\1errill C. Faux and a 
pre-trial order entered on September 11, 1959, (R. 26-28). 
Each of the parties hereto then filed a separate motion 
for Summary Judgment and the respective motions came 
on for· hearing on the 15th day of October, 1959, before 
the I-Ionorable Stewart M. Hanson. The Court, on the 
23rd day of October, 1959, granted the Defendant Peter 
W. I-Iumrnel's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the Defendant Lee Dahl and against the Plaintiffs, (R. 
29-30)~ 
It is from this Motion for Summary Judgment that 
the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Lee L. Dahl have ap-
pealed. The Motion for Summary Judgment was based 
upon the pleadings and upon the depositions and ex-
hibits submitted at the pre-trial conference. There were 
no separate affidavits submitted with any of the motions 
for summary judgment. 
In order to give the court a better understanding 
of the facts, the Appellants desire to give a brief suinma-
tion of what was produced at the deposition as to the 
actual background for this law suit. In order to simplify 
this brief, the depositions will hereafter be referred to 
by citing the depositions as follows: Margaret S. Garner 
will be cited as "G" followed by the page reference, 
Peter W. Hummel will be cited as "H" followed by the 
6 
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page reference and Lee L. Dahl will be cited as "D" fol-
lowed by the page reference. 
The Defendant I-Iu1nmel is a graduate geologist and 
during all times material hereto was living out of the 
state of Utah but had been interested in finding a home 
to purchase here in Salt lake City. About the end of 
October, or the first part of November, 1958, the Defend-
ant Hurnmel contacted the Plaintiff Margaret Garner 
for the purpose of having her, as a licensed real estate 
agent, help him to find a home in Salt Lake City, 
(H. 3). The Defendant Hummel described to Margaret 
Garner the general size and type of a home in which 
he would be interested, (H. 3). On five or six occasions 
prior to December 16, 1958, Mr. Hummel and Mrs. 
Garner went out to look at different homes, (H. 4). 
The particular home under construction and which gives 
rise to the basis of this law suit was located at 5834 
Brentwood Drive in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Garner and 
Mr. Hummel drove by the home and took a look at 
it from the outside but because the doors were sealed 
up with a plastic material they couldn't get in, 
(H. 6). Subsequently, Mr. Hummel and Mrs. Garner 
managed to go through the interior of this home and 
made a complete inspection of it, (H. 6). At the time 
of the inspection of this home by the Defendant Hum1nel 
the exterior walls and interior walls were all constructed 
and the roof was on but the home had not had its 
interior decorating or interior fixtures installed, (H. 
8). Defendant Hummel examined the property on several 
occasions. Before the earnest money agreement was 
entered into on December 16, 1958, Defendant Hummel 
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went through the property with Defendant Dahl. This 
home was being constructed by the Defendant Dahl for his 
own personal use, (D. 2). When the DefendantHummel 
expressed an interest in this property the Plaintiff ili 
l\.fargaret Garner contacted the Defendant Dahl to see if t~ 
he was interested in selling it and finally obtained a 
listing agreement from him on Dece1nber 10, 1958, (D. 
19 and Exhibit D2 attached to deposition). 
Mr. Hummell was acquainted with the fact that 
this home was not one being constructed for sale but 
constructed for Mr. Dahl as his own home and that jt 
was through the efforts of Mrs. Garner that Mr. Dahl 
would be willing to sell, (H. 9). l\1r. Hummel said that 
he inquired about the square footage of the home and 
was told that it was approximately 4,000 square feet 
by Mr. Dahl and that l\!l:rs. Garner said that she thought 
it was about 3,900 square feet, (H. 10). Mrs. Garner 
was asked in her deposition as to whether or not Mr. 
Hum1nel didn't ask Mr. Dahl the number of square 
feet and she replied that she recalled it was 3,700 or 
3,900 something under 4,000 square feet, she wasn't 
certain, (G. 14). ~fr. Dahl said that he thought there 
was approxi1nately 4,000 square feet in the house but 
that he had never measured it, (D. 29-30). The Defend-
ant Dahl had not made any blue print plans or speci-
fications on the home before l\.fr. Hummel entered the 
picture since he was the owner-builder, (D. 6). There 
were, however, certain plans as to certain parts of it, 
such as the kitchen, (H. 11, 19). l\Ir. Hummel and 1\lt:". 
Dahl had on occasions discussed the finishing of the 
house in respect to its decoration, utilities and fixtures. 
8 
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After seeing the house on several occasions Mr. Hummel 
expressed the interest in it and on December 10, 1958, 
:Mrs. Garner obtained the Sales Agency Contract from 
Mr. Dahl, (Exhibit D2 attached to D's deposition). She 
then contacted Mr. Hummel and said that she thought 
they could possibly get the house for $75,000.00, (II. 
18). Mr. Hummel said that this was the price that was 
''suitable to me if we could get some indication as to 
how the house was to be finished and put it down." 
(;H. 18). A general discussion had been held between 
Mr. Hunnnel and 1Ir. Dahl as to the completion but 
l\Ir. Hummel stated that he would like some further 
inforn1ation on it and would be willing to pay $75,000.00 
for the house "if it could be completed in a manner to 
me - quality wise, and so forth, in a manner of our 
mutual agreement." (H. 18). 
On December 16, 1958, a earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase was prepared by Mr. Wilford Kirton, 
attorney for Mr. Hummel and signed by Mr. Hummel 
as purchaser. Mr. Hummel was asked whether after 
the document had been prepared if he read it over: 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Both the type written portion and the 
printed matter? 
"A. The fine print, yes." (H. 22) 
l\1rs. Garner then took the earnest money receipt 
to l\1:r. Dahl for his signature and on the same date, 
December 16, 1958, obtained the signature of Mr. Dahl 
on the agreement, (G. 19). However, an addition was 
placed on the earnest money receipt and offer to pur-
9 
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chase in pen changing the completion date from January 
15, 1959 to February 1st or sooner. (See Exhibit D3 
attached to D's d€position, also H. 32). At the time 
of obtaining the signature of Mr. Dahl on the agree-
ment Mrs. Garner also obtained the specifications as 
to how the home was to be completed by Mr. Dahl, 
(G. 19). These specifications were obtained in dupli-
cate. on·· the same evening, Mrs. Garner then took 
one set of the specifications to Mr. Hummel late that 
same evening, (G. 29). At the time of delivering to 
·Mr. Hummel a copy of the specifications, Mrs. Garner 
said, ''Mr. Hummel, you have bought a house," (G. 
29). Mr. ·Hummel then signed the receipt on the bottom 
portion . of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to ~: 
Purchase, acknowledging a complete copy of the agree-
ment, (G. 20 and H. 33). During the periods of these 
negotiations and the signing of the agreement, Mrs. 
Hummel had not been present. Mr. Hummel indicated 
that he would like to bring his wife into the state to a; 
see the house. Subsequently J\1rs. Hummel came into the 
State of Utah to go over the house. J\1r. Hunm1el also "' 
contacted Mrs. Garner about procuring a landscaper 
to do development work on the outside of the house, 
(II. 33-34). Mr. Hummel brought an interior decorator 
with him when he subsequently came back to Utah 
in the forepart of January, 1959, (H. 41). He claims 
that at the time of the bringing in of the decorator 
and. on this occasion in January he measured the square 
footage of the house and found it to be approximately 
3,400 square feet, (H. 41). At the time of the execution 
of the Earnest Money and receipt nothing was said 
10 
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by Mr. Hummel nor any of the other parties about 
the square footage in the house, (If. 22). Between the 
16th day of December and the lOth day of January, 
:Mr. Hummel had in his possession a copy of the. speci-
fications furnished by Mr. Dahl, through Mrs .. Garner 
and during this time he never contacted Mr. Dahl about 
any changes in the home, (H. 45). Mr. Hummel said 
that he had, however, discussed in several phone con-
versations with Mrs. Garner the possibility that he 
would like to make some changes in the finishing work 
of the home. After the Earnest Money Agreement was 
executed by the parties hereto and the specifications 
delivered to Mr. Hummel he thereafter never ·asked 
Mrs. Garner whether or not there were any further 
specifications or plans, (G. 45). On the contrary he 
came again to Salt Lake with an interior decorator to 
help plan the final designing of the inside of the 
house. Mr. Dahl says that when Mr. and Mrs. Hummel 
came back to see the house in January, 1960, they went 
through the house and indicated the changes they wanted 
made, (D. 31). 
~Irs. Garner states that the specifications to be 
attached to the earnest money receipt were those speci-
fications showing exactly how ~ir. Dahl had intended 
to complete the home for his own use, giving the details 
of what was to be done in the final decorating of the 
home as he had originally planned it, (G. 47). She 
further testified that it was also understood between 
the parties that if Mr. Hummel desired to make any 
changes or alterations in the specifications as originally 
contemplated by Mr. Dahl that Mr. Hummel would be 
11 
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given credit if the change was for less money than 
what Mr. Dahl had planned or he would pay the addi-
tional cost if the change exceeded the cost contemplated 
by Mr: Dahl, (G. 47). 
Mr. Hummel states this understanding as follows: 
"Q. I am interested, Mr. Hummel, in get-
ting, insofar as possible, the substance of the 
conversation between you and l\frs. Garner before 
you went to Mr. Kirton's office. Now, first of 
all, did you discuss the purchase price as to 
what you would pay or what Mr. Dahl may be 
willing to sell this property for~ 
"A. Yes, I think she did. I think she said 
- I was under the impression that she had 
talked to Mr. Dahl on the telephone and that 
through these discussions on the telephone with 
him she had felt that she could probably get 
the house for $75,000 and she told me this, and 
I said that this sort of a price was suitable to 
me if we could get some indication as to how 
the house was to be finished and put it down. 
She set the seventy-five thousand figure and I 
concurred. 
"Q. Had Mr. Dahl told you, prior to the 
tirne that :Mrs. Garner stated that she thought it 
could be obtained for $75,000, how he had in-
tended to complete the house in respect to the 
finishing matters, as to decorating, putting in 
of the utilities and the fixtures, as it is socalled ~ 
"A. He had spoken of it smne in very gen-
eral tenns, yes." (H.18) 
The pre-trial order entered by Judge Faux on the 
11th day of September, 1959, (R. 26-28) was prepared 
12 
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by counsel and subn1itted to the court for his signature. 
This final draft was prepared by the attorney for Mr. 
Hummel and recites in it the position of Mr. Hummel 
as follows: 
"In his Answer, Defendant Hummel alleges 
that certain misrepresentations were .made to 
him regarding the square footage of said home 
by the Defendant Dahl; that said misrepresenta-
tions were made for the purpose of deceiving 
said Defendant, and did deceive him; that he 
relied upon the same and by reason thereof, 
was induced to enter into the contract, and there;. 
by seeks recision of the same and return of the 
deposit made. Defendant Hummel likewise al-
leges that the contract for the purchase of said 
home was not completed and that the execution 
of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase was conditional upon approval by said 
Humrnel of certain specifications which were 
never approved by him so that no contract for 
the purchase of said home was in fact made." 
(R. 27) (Emphasis added). 
At the pre-trial the Court framed certain issues to 
be resolved at trial. The first four issues to be resolved 
by the Trial Court were as follows: 
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant 
liummel obtain recision on the ground of mis-
representations being made in connection with 
the square footage of said home. 
"2. In the event said Defendant may raise 
such issue, an issue of fact will be whether 
such misrepresentations were made as to justify 
recision of the contract. 
"3. Another issue of law is and will be 
whether the Defendant Hummel may introduce 
13 
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oral testimony relative to the execution of said 
contract to the effect that said contract was 
, · signed conditionally and was not intended to be 
accepted as the completed contract between the 
parties. 
"4. In the event that it is determined that 
Defendant llummel may introduce oral testi-
mony, an issue of fact will be whether or not 
the contract marked Exhibit "D3" is a binding 
contract between the parties." (R. 27) · 
As hereinbefore stated the Motions for Summary 
Judgment were then filed and the matter heard before 
the Honorable Stewart M. IIanson on the 15th day of 
October, 1959, and a Summary Judgment entered in 
favor of Defendant Peter Hummel and against the 
Defendant Dahl and the Plaintiff herein on the 23rd 
day of October, 1959. It is from this Summary Judg-
ment that Plaintiffs and Defendants Dahl have appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends: 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT PETER W. HUMMEL 
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT : 
A. AS A MAT'TER OF LAW, THERE WAS A BIND-
ING .CONTRACT UPON THE PARTIES IN THE FORM OF 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT. 
B. THERE IS A BONA FIDE ISSUE OF FACT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE 
WAS. A . MISREPRESENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE AGREEMENT. 
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C. IN ANY EVENT WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS 
A BINDING CONTRACT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO. THE 
TRIER OF THE FACT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT PETER W. HUMMEL 
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS A BIND-
ING ·CONTRACT UPON THE PARTIES IN THE FORM OF 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT. 
Because of the complexity of the issues and the 
numerous pleadings filed in this matter, the Court at 
pre-trial and after a discussion with the parties, asked 
the attorneys to prepare a pre-trial order in connection 
with this case. A draft of the pre-trial order was pre-
pared by the Plaintiffs' attorney and submitted to the 
Defendants' attorneys. The changes were then made in 
this draft and the final pre-trial order prepared by 
Mr. Kirton, the attorney for the Defendant Hummel. 
It is significant to note that the allegations claimed by 
the Defendant Hummel were restricted to two in par-
ticular: First, that there had been a misrepresentation 
(as to this point the Appellant will discuss the same 
hereafter in the brief); and second, the pre-trial order 
states "Defendant Hummel likewise alleges that the 
contract for the purchase of said home was not com-
pleted and that the execution of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was conditional upon 
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approval by Mr. Hummel of certain specifications 
which were never approved by him so that no contract 
for the purchase of said home was in fact made." (R. 
27) (Emphasis added). 
The Court in the pre-trial order then framed the 
issues to be resolved by the trial court. In Issue No. 3 
the Court stated the issue as follows: "Another issue 
of law is and will be whether the Defendant Hummel 
may introduce oral testimony relative to the execution 
of said contract to the effect that said contract was 
signed conditionally and was not intended to be ac-
cepted as the completed contract by the parties." (R. 
27). I-Iaving stated this as an issue of law, the Court 
then framed Issue No. 4 to be resolved by the trial 
court as follows: "In the event that it is determined 
that the Defendant Hummel may introduce oral testi-
Inony, an issue of fact will be whether or not the contract 
marked Exhibit "D3" is a binding contract between 
the Parties." (R. 27). 
Thus clearly in view of the pre-trial order two 
issues in connection with whether or not the contract 
was a completed contract were fixed by the pre-trial 
order. First, an issue of law and assuming that a court 
should rule as a matter of law that the contract was 
conditional and that oral testimony could be intro-
duced regarding its conditional effect then the court 
still kept as an issue, an issue of fact to be determined 
between the parties. 
Insofar as the issues are concerned between the 
parties in this case, the pre-trial order governs. See 
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Rule 16 U.R.C.P. wherein it is stated 1n referring to 
the pre-trial order : 
"The court shall make an order which recites 
the action taken at the conference, the amend-
ment allowed to the pleadings, and the agree-
ments made by the parties as to any of the mat-
ters considered, and which limits the issu.es for 
trial to those not disposed of by admissions or 
agreements of counsel; .and such order when en-
tered controls the subsequent course of the act~on, 
unless modified at the trial to prevent mani-
festing justice." (Emphasis added) 
It is clear, therefore, that upon a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment the Court could not resolve all of the 
issues because one of the issues was an issue of fact 
reserved and had to be determined even in spite of 
the fact that the court may have determined that the 
contract was signed conditionally and could allow oral 
testimony to that effect. 
There has never been any argument nor is there 
any issue between the parties that the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was executed by the 
parties on December 16, 1958. The sole issue between 
these parties as to this agreement ~s whether or not 
the agreement was conditional in that the specifications 
had to be approved by Mr. Hummel. No real issue is 
made of the fact that there were never any plans at-
tached because the home was 80 percent complete and 
the plans with design of location of rooms and so forth 
would all be superfluous, (D. 9 & 10). It was the speci-
fications on how 1\tfr. Dahl proposed to complete the 
house which gave Mr. Hummel the most concern. This 
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is bourne out by· the pre-trial order since the only 
question raised was whether or not :Mr. Hummel had 
to approve the specifications, (R. 27). The portion of 
the earnest money receipt which was prepared by Mr. 
Hummel's attorney and typed in re.ads as follows: 
'' S~ller · agrees to furnish said home and premises in 
accordance with attached plan and spec., at his expense 
on or before the 15th day of January, 1959." (Exhibit 
D3 attached to D's deposition). Nothing is said in the 
earnest money receipt about the specifications being 
subject to the approval of JYir. Hummel.- This is at-
tempted to be proven by the Defendant Hummel by 
means of.· an oral modification of the written agreement 
and in direct violations of the terms of the agreement 
signed . by all of the parties. The agreement clearly 
states that there are no verbal statements relative 
to the tr~nsaction in the following words: "It is under-
stood and agreed that the terms written in this receipt 
constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the 
purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement 
made by anyone relative to this transaction shall be 
construed to be a part of this transaction unless in-
corporated in writing herein." (En1phasis added) (Lines 
33 and 34 of Exhibit "D3" attached to Dahl's deposition). 
It is adrnitted by all parties concerned that the 
specifications were prepared and submitted to Mr. 
IIummel at the time that he acknowledged a receipt of 
the final copy of the agreement bearing all the signa-
tures of the parties on December 16, 1958, (G. 29; H. 33). 
In his deposition Mr. Hu1nn1el '\Vas asked and testified 
as follows about the fine print in the agreement: 
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)• )i. 
"Q. After he had prepared the document to 
which we refer, Exhibit D-3, did you read it over~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Both the typewritten portion and the 
printed matter~ · 
"A. The fine print, yes .. " (Emphasis add~d) 
(H. 22) 
Nowhere in the agreement is there any · statn1ent 
whatsoever that the agreement was conditional upon 
Mr. Hummel making a separate approval of the speci-
fications. He in fact approved them when he took the 
specifications and signed the receipt on the agreement. 
He has never at any time claimed that the specifications 
were hot as represented by Mr. Dahl in their prior 
conversation, (D. 50). 
The understanding of l\1r. IIummel as to the nature 
of the plans and specifications to be submitted is 
clearly shown in his deposition beginning with Page 18: 
"Q. I am interested, Mr. Hummel; in get-
ting, insofar as possible, the substance of the 
conversation between you and Mrs. Garner be-
fore you went to Mr. Kirton's office. Now, first 
of all, did you discuss the purchase price as to 
what you would pay or what Mr. Dahl may be 
willing to sell this property for~ 
"A. Yes, I think she did. I think she said -
I was under the impression that she had talked 
to Mr. Dahl on the telephone and that· through 
these discussions· on the telephone with him she 
had felt that she could probably get the house 
for $75,000 and she told me this, and. I "said that 
this sort of a price was suitable .to me if we 
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could get some indication as to how the house 
was to be finished and put it down. She set 
the seventy-five thousand figure and I concurred. 
"Q. Had Mr. Dahl told you, prior to the 
time that Mrs. Garner stated that she thought 
it could be obtained for $75,000, how he had in-
tended to complete the house in respect to the 
finishing matters, as to decorating, putting in 
of the utilities and fixtures, as it is so-called¥ 
"A. He had spoken of it some in very gen-
eral terms, yes. 
"Q. And in the light of what Mr. Dahl had 
told you and your own physical observation of 
the property, did you believe that you would 
be willing to pay $75,000 for the property¥ 
"A. Well, I didn't believe that I would be 
willing to pay $75,000 for the property as it 
stood. I felt that I would be willing to pay $75,000 
for the property if it could be completed in a 
manner to my- quality wise, and so forth, in a 
manner of our mutual agreement. 
"Q. When you speak of your mutual agree-
ment, had you told Mr. Dahl on the morning or 
on the day that you inspected the property with 
him how you wanted the house to be completed¥ 
"A. No. 
"Q. So that the only information you had 
as to how the property was to be completed was 
what he had told you as to how he intended to 
complete it~ 
'A. Generally speaking, that is correct. But 
he hadn't told me in very specific terms. He just 
said generally that this type of fixture goes in 
the kitchen and this type of fixture goes some 
place else, and in completing a home there is 
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very much more detail. work involved than just 
general-
"Q. In respect to the kitchen itself, had he 
not shown you the plans and drawings of the 
completion of the kitchen in accordance with 
the subcontractor that was going to install the 
cabinets' 
"A. Yes, he showed me some of the plans 
there, yes. 
"Q. And you were aware that there were 
no plot plans or profile drawings of the structure 
of the house itself, were you not 7 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And as far as that type of plan was 
concerned, there was no purpose after you saw 
the house to have any plan as to what was going 
to be done insofar as the base of the house or 
exterior walls or the roof because that had al-
ready been completed, isn't that right~ 
"A. Yes, that's correct." (H. 18 to 20) 
It was never considered nor contemplated by the 
parties that any blueprints should be drawn to show 
the finished work in the house. The Court can take 
judicial notice as a matter of common policy that these 
are details which are included in the specifications as 
to the type of finish there is to be put into the home. 
As indicated by Mr. Hummel in his deposition the home 
so far as the structure and the walls and the interior 
walls were concerned was all fixed. It was only a rna tter 
of where and how the fixtures were to be placed in 
the rooms and what kind of paint, etc., was to be put 
in. At this point it was not contemplated nor under-
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'stood that Mr. Rummel w~s paying $75,000 for the home 
to be completed in the manner in which he desired 
beca:use he was buying a home which was being built 
by Mr.· Dahl .for himself and it was the intent of the 
-parties that Mr. Dahl would sell the home fo:r the price 
of $75,000 with the finish as he had originally. planned. 
::Mr .. Dahl and Mr. Hummel went thr.ough the home and 
outlined the details of what the plans were of Mr. Dahl 
in finishing the home. 
It was the understanding- and intention of the par-
ties here that Mr. Hummel, if he desired to make any 
changes in the finishing work that was planned by 
Mr. Dahl, would either receive credit if the change was 
for a lesser amount than what Mr. Dahl had contem-
plated· or would have to pay for an additional sum if 
the change was in excess of what Mr. Dahl had con-
templated. 
Mrs. Garner testified in response to questions by 
Mr~ Nielsen as follows : 
"Q. And isn't it also a fact that Mr. Hum-
mel verbally told Mr. Dahl that if, after receiving 
the details of how Mr. Dahl _was going to com-
plete it for himself, that Mrs. Humn1el wanted 
to make any changes that Mr. Hummel ·would 
then pay any extra that would be required~ 
"A. That is it exactly, and that is why no 
one was concerned with this. · 
"Q. In other words, Exhibit D-4 was to 
assure Mr. Hummel that if· his wife had no ob-
jection to the way Mr. Dahl had it planned that 
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Mr. Dahl would ·complete it according to tho~~ 
said specifications f 
"A. Right. 
"Q. But that if Mrs. Hummel did have any 
difference of opinion as to color and materials 
that she wanted in the finishing of the house, 
then they would pay ~xtra or get a credit if 
~hey eliminated them f 
"A. Right, and that was discussed many 
times. 
"Q. So that the $75,000 which Mr. Hummel 
was to pay was to buy the house as it was, as 
he saw it, with the house to be finished as Mr. 
Dahl said he would finish itf 
"A. That's the truth. 
"Q. And if there were to be any changes 
made in it, just changes in any type of con-
struction, he would be given a credit or a charge 
depending upon whether the changes necessitated 
additional work or eliminated work~ 
"A. Right. And he said that, I think, in 
front of you. 
"Q. So that when you gave Mr. Hummel 
the specifications marked Exhibit D-4 that, so 
far as you were concerned, completed the trans-
action and compiled with the part of the earnest 
money receipt that said that the specifications 
would be attached~ 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. And was it after that, after you had 
given him the specifications, that Mr. Hummel 
then reconfirmed the contract by signing it~ 
"A. Yes, after he had these in his hands 
then he signed the receipt and signed the -
initialed the completion date. 
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"Q. So that he not only reconfirmed the 
contract by signing the receipt for it, but he 
also confirmed an extension of time in which 
to complete it~ 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Did he thereafter at any time ever claim 
in your presence that the specifications which 
you had given him on the night of the 16th were 
not the specifications which he had requested or 
which Mr. Kirton had indicated he should get 
in connection with signing the earnest money 
receipt~ 
"A. Never." (G. 47 and 48) 
The Defendant Hummel has never at any time asked 
for any further plans or blueprints in connection with 
home nor for any other specifications, (G. 38). 
After Mr. Hummel signed the agreement on De-
cember 16, 1958, he returned to Salt Lake City in 
January, 1959, and at no time had he ever objected 
that the specifications were not as agreed, (D. 50 and 
G. 45). After the date of December 16th, Mr. Hummel 
even called Mrs. Garner and asked her to have a land-
scape gardner and interior decorator for the home, (G. 
45). Mr. Hummel and his wife and their interior decora-
tor went through the house in January, 1959 and told 
Mr. Dahl of the changes they wanted made. They marked 
up the finished walls, had cabinets removed, and had 
the outside of the house repainted from green to white 
in color. (D. 51 and 31). None of these ite1ns would 
indicate that they were to "approve" the specifications 
or that the agreement was "conditional." The .conduct 
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of Mr. and Mrs. Hummel would indicate that they 
recognized the agreement as binding. Mr. Dahl testified 
in his deposition that Mr. Hummel called him and said 
that the "deal is off" "because you misrepresented 
the square footage." (D. 31) Nothing was said about 
approving or not approving the specifications. Their 
actions evidenced a contrary position to the one now 
taken by their attorney. 
Surely the position of the ·Defendant Hummel has 
been and still is that he was to approve any specifica-
tions submitted and because of his failure to approve 
them there was no contract. The trial court in granting 
the motion for summary judgment has erred as a mat-
ter of law in holding that the agreement was subject 
to approval because the agreement does not at any 
place or any place in it say that the plans and specifi-
cation were to be subject to the approval of the De-
fendant Hummel. On the contrary the agreement reads: 
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises with 
attached plan and spec., at his expense on or before 
the 15th day of January, 1959." The Defendant Hummel 
has acknowledged a receipt of the agreement at the 
time that he received the specifications from Mrs. 
Garner. (Exhibit D3 attached to Dahl's deposition). 
In this case it is ad1nitted that the "attached plan 
and spec.," were not "attached" as such to the earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase, but the Defendant 
Peter Hummel was delivered the specifications and 
has not complained of the fact that they were not 
attached but his position has been and is that he was 
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to approve the specifications as received. Again re-
ferring to the pre-trial order as prepared by Defendant 
Hummel's attorney, the order provides: 
"Defendant Hummel likewise alleges that 
the contract for the purchase of said home was 
not completed and that the execution of the 
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase was 
conditional upon approval by said Hummel of 
certain specificat~ons which were never approved 
by him so that no contract for the purchase of 
said home was in fact made." (R. 27) (Emphasis 
added). 
There is no place in the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase wherein the approval was re-
quired by Mr~ Hummel of the specifications. Since this 
receipt and form was prepared by Mr. Hummel's at-
torney at the instance and request of Mr. Hummel it 
would seem that if this was one of the conditions 
necessary for the contract that such a clause would 
have been placed in there by parties. Furthermore in 
quoting from the forn1 on Line 33 to35 the form reads 
as follows: 
"It is understood and agreed that the terms 
written in this reecipt constitute and entire pre-
liminary contract between the purchaser and the 
seller, and that no verbal statements made by 
anyone relative to this transaction shall be con-
strued to be a part of this transaction unless 
incorporated in writing herein." 
Mr. Hummel said at the time of the executing of 
this agreement that he read it carefully, including the 
fine pn1nt, (H. 22). What the Defendant Hummel is 
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seeking to do here is to claim that there is no contract 
between the parties because there was no approval of 
specifications and this is in direct violation of the parol 
evidence rule. The contract itself is clear and unam-
biguous. 
Briefly stated the parol evidence rule restricts the 
use of oral testimony which would tend to vary, or 
contradict the terms of an unambiguous written instru-
ment. 
By clear and unambiguous terms the contract in 
question (Exhibit D-3) recites that the building is to 
be completed in accordance with attached plans and 
specifications. Nothing in the writing gives any indica-
tion that the parties contemplated that the plans and 
specifications were to be approved before the contract 
became effective. Had this been the case it would have 
been very easy to insert an approval clause. However, 
this was not done and it should be noted that Defendant 
Hummel placed his signature on the agreement at two 
different times. First as the offeror and the second 
time acknowledging receipt of a final copy of the 
agreement. 
This Court has frequently dealt with the Parol 
Evidence Rule. In a recent Federal case handed down 
by the Tenth Circuit (Nephi Processing Plant v. Talbot, 
247 Fed. 2d 771) a problem very similar to the one 
now before the Court was ruled upon and the Utah 
law was examined by the Court. Briefly the facts were 
these: An agreement had been entered into between a 
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processing plant and an individual whereby the pro-
cessing plant was to process the individual's turkeys. 
A provision in the contract provided that the individual 
should transport his turkeys to the plant, however, the 
individual contended that upon discussing this provision 
in the contract with the representative of the proces-
sor, the individual was told that the processing plant 
paid all but a very nominal portion of the transporta-
tion costs. The trial court allowed this parol evidence 
,concerning the agreement as to transportation costs 
to come in. However, on appeal the Circuit Court re-
veresed the lower court and at page 775 of 247 Fed. 
2d summarized the Utah law as follows: 
"The Talbots testified that prior to signing 
this agreement, Nephi had advised them that it 
would transport the turkeys without any charge 
except the Colorado ten mile tax. 'They said that 
they understood the language in the agreement 
to mean that they were to deliver the turkeys 
to Nephi's trucks, which in turn would deliver 
them to the processing plant. This testimony 
is inconsistent with the provisions of a written 
agreement between the parties. By unambiguous 
terms in the processing contract, the Talbots 
agreed to deliver the turkeys to the processor 
at Nephi, Utah. The terms of such a contract 
cannot be altered, varied or contradicted by parol 
evidence." 
The court cited the following Utah cases on the 
point: 
Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143 
P.2d 281, 151 A.L.R. 275; Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 
184, 72 P.2d 449, 129 A.L.R. 666; Halloran-Judge Trust 
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Co. v. Health, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 64 A.L.R. 368; 
Ill oyle v. Congreg,ational Soc. of S.L.C., 16 Utah 169, 
50 P. 806; Degnan, Parol Evidence, The Utah Vers~on, 
5 Utah Law Review, No. 2, 158. 
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, in his article uParol 
Evvdence - Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review, No. 
2, Page 162 summarizes the reasoning behind the Parol 
Evidence Law. His summary is squarely applicable in 
this instance since the Defendant Hummel acknowledges 
receiving a copy of the final agreement. Quoting from 
Page 162 of Vol. 5 of the Utah Law Review, Professor 
Degnan states the reasoning as follows: 
. "This final agreement is the agreement of 
the parties; it is the jural act to which the law 
attributes changes in legal relationships. In short, 
the later agreement supersedes all former. Thus 
former negotiations or even agreements are ex-
cluded from a trial not because evidence as to 
their existence would be untrustworthy but be-
cause they are legally im1naterial; if their exist-
tence were proved or even admitted it would not 
affect the rules of law to be applied in deter-
mining the disposition of the case." 
So the Defendant in this instance should be held 
to his bargain and should not be permitted to establish 
by parol terms which are not expressed in the agremnent. 
The Earnest Money Agreement and specifications 
which were delivered to Mr. Hummel at the time that 
he initialed the change in the agreement fixing the 
completion date as February 1 "or sooner" and signed 
at the bottom acknowledging ''receipt of a final copy 
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of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures" are 
attached to the depositions as exhibits~ 
B. THERE IS A BONA FIDE ISSUE OF FACT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE 
WAS A MISREPRESENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE AGREEMENT. 
In the pre-trial order as signed by Judge Faux, the 
issues to be resolved at trial were enumerated with the 
first and second issues being as follows: 
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant Hummel 
obtain recision on the ground of misrepresentations 
being made in connection with the square footage of said 
home. 
"2. In the event said Defendants may raise such 
issue, an issue of fact will be whether such misrepre-
sentations were made as to justify recision of the con-
tract." (R. 27) 
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact that 
a Summary Judgment may be granted when there is no 
dispute of facts and that the matter is clear to the 
court that the judgment should be granted in accordance 
with the relief prayed for. In this case the court has 
set up a definite issue of fact as to whether or not there 
were any such rnisrepresentations as would justify the 
recision of the contract. If there is any reasonable con-
flict in the evidence the motion for Summary Judg-
ment must be reversed on these grounds. Certainly 
this is an issue of fact to be submitted to the trier of the 
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facts and not to be resolved by summary judgment. Mr. 
Dahl testified that when Mr. Hummel returned to Utah 
in January of 1960 after examining the home and having 
several conferences he called Mr. Dahl and said: "The 
deal is off." Mr. Dahl wanted to know why the deal was 
off. Mr. Hummel replied: "Because you misrepresented 
,· 
the square footage." (D. 31) 
Mr. Hummel testified that he was concerned about 
the square footage of the home and in his deposition he 
testified as follows : 
"Well, I had been quite concerned, as I was 
in most of the homes that I went into, about the 
size of the house, so before talking to Mr. Dahl, 
but while still looking at the house with Mrs. 
Garner, I asked her, did she have any sort of an 
idea of the size of the house from the standpoint 
of square footage, and at that time she said she 
was not certain but that she thought it would be 
around 3,900 square feet. And then when we saw 
Mr. Dahl that first day, besides looking at the -
walking through and looking at the various rooms, 
I asked him how big the house was, what was the 
square footage, and he said approximately 4,000, 
and then I asked him various questions which I 
cannot recall at this time about certain things as 
we walked through the house and how he intended 
to finish this and finish one and another and not-
he told me various things but, being completely 
unfamiliar with decorating a home or furnishing 
a home, I had no real idea what the real signifi-
cance of these things might be. I admit to being 
an amateur and so I felt that when the time came, 
why, I would hire some sort of a consultant to 
advise me." (H. 10). 
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Mr. Hummel further recalled a conversation with 
Mrs. Garner after talking to Mr. Dahl in which he and 
Mrs. Garner joked about the fact that Mr. Dahl was not 
certain about the number of square feet in the building. 
l\1r. Hummel referred to this conversation by saying: 
" ... This discussion that you are talking 
about with Mrs. Garner, I think I remember say-
ing that, 'I don't think he knows what he has got 
in the house from the standpoint of what his ex-
penses are and the rest of it. The fact that he 
said "approximately 4,000 square feet" makes it 
quite evident that he didn't know exactly how 
many square feet there are.'" (H.13). 
Mr. Dahl testified that he had never measured the 
square footage of the home and that he told Mr. Hummel 
that he did not know how many square feet there were 
in the home but he said it could be around 4,000 square 
feet, (D. 29). Mr. Dahl further said that because he had 
never measured, he assumed there could be anywhere 
from 3,500 to 4,500 square feet because this was some-
thing that he was not concerned with since he had built 
the home with the design and size in mind as to meet his 
needs and not with the over all size, (D. 30). 
Mrs. Garner testified that she was present during 
the conversation between 1Ir. Hummel and Mr. Dahl 
and to the best of her recollection ~Ir. Dahl said it was 
somewhere between 3,700 and 3,900 square feet or some-
thing under 4,000. She didn't ren1e1nber for sure. She 
said that she wasn't paying too n1uch attention to the size 
being quoted, (G.l4). And 1\frs. Garner further testified 
that when Mr. Hu1nmel first inquired about the size of 
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the home she said that she had a tape measure and told 
him he could measure it if he wanted to but nothing was 
done about this, (G. 16). This obviously makes a conflict 
in the testimony and the facts to be determined by the 
trier of the fact and not on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to what representations were made and 
what reliance was made upon these representations. 
A very excellent annotation entitled, "Tort liability 
for damages for misrepresentations as to the area of real 
property sold or exchanged" is contained in 54 A.L.R. 2d 
beginning at Page 660. In this annotation two statements 
of significance are quoted. The first is found on Page 
681 wherein the annotator says: 
"The vendor of real property is liable in tort, 
where, with intent to deceive his purchaser, he or 
his agent misrepresented the quantity of the land, 
and the purchaser relied upon such representa-
tions in mak~ng the purchase." (Emphasis added) 
See also Page 682 wherein the annotator says: 
"Where a vendee of real property justifiably 
relies upon the misrepresentations of the vendor 
or his agent as to the area of the land, recovery 
may be had in tort if such representations are 
found to have been fraudulent." (Emphasis add-
ed) 
In our case Mr. Hum1nel did not rely upon the repre-
sentations made by Mr. Dahl and in fact made the state-
ment to :Mrs. Garner that he knew Mr. Dahl did not know 
how many square feet there were in the house, (H.13). 
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The recent Utah case of. Pace v. Parrish, (1952), 
122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273 cites the rules of law for this 
state by saying that the burden is upon a person claiming 
the fraudulent charges to prove them by clear and co11.-
vincing evidence and further that the elements of the 
fraud are: 
"These are: (1) That a representation was 
made; ( 2) concerning a presently existing ma-
terial fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representa-
tion; ( 5) for the purpose of inducing . the other 
party, to act upon it; ( 6) that the other party, act-
ing reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; ( 8) and was thereby in-
duced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. See 
Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 
227 P. 791; Jones v. Pingree, 73 Utah 190, 273 P. 
303; 23 Am. Jur. 773; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, Sec. 3, 
p. 215." 
In the Parrish case one of the things complained of 
was a representation by the seller that the quality of the 
certain land was just as good in one place as another 
area and that the land could be cultivated, wherein and 
whereas in fact there were large boulders on the land and 
anyone by looking at the land could see that there were 
rocks the size of a man's head. The court stated: 
"Parrish did nothing to actively prevent the 
Paces from n1aking an inspection of it and it 
would have been little trouble to do so. Under 
those circumstances, we believe that it must be 
said as a matter of law that the plaintiffs did not 
use reasonable care and diligence. They were, 
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therefore, not entitled to rely on the representa-
tion and that item of $1,750.00 in the judgment 
cannot be sustained." 
In the Parrish case again, there was involved a por-
tion of land which had been apparently referred to as 
being owned and which in fact wa~ not owned by the 
seller yet the appearance of the land was such that it 
was impossible to tell that it was different from any 
other land in the area. The court found that it would have 
been expensive and involved for the purchasers to have 
made a survey and examination of the title to ascertain 
the ownership of this 11% acres and this court held that 
they were not obligated to do so under the circumstances 
and said "Their duty to use reasonable care would not 
require them to go to such lengths." Such is not the case 
in the matter of Mr. Hu1nmel because Mrs. Garner offer-
ed to measure the building with him if he wanted and 
it was easily excessable and he could have Inade such 
measurements as he desired. 
This is not a case where the person who claims he 
was defrauded was prevented from examining the prop-
erty. Furthermore, ~fr. Hummel admits that he knew 
that 1'Ir. Dahl did not know how many square feet there 
were in the building and therefore did not rely upon any 
statement of Mr. Dahl's. 
C. IN ANY EVENT 'WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS 
A BINDING CONTRACT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE 
TRIER OF THE FACT. 
In the pre-trial order the Court clearly sets out two 
issues of fact to be submitted: 
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"1 .... 
"2. In the event said Defendant may raise 
such issue, an issue of fact will be whether such 
misrepresentations were made as to justify re-
cision of the contract. 
"3. . .. 
"4. In the event that it is determined that 
Defendant Hummel may introduce oral testimony, 
an issue of fact will be whether or not the contract 
marked Exhibit 'D 3' is a binding contract between 
the parties.'' (R. 27) 
In this brief we have heretofore clearly pointed out 
that a definite conflict appears in the testimony between 
the parties. Certainly Mr. Dahl and Mrs. Garner claim 
that whether or not there was any misrepresentation of 
any facts as to square footage is a question of fact to 
be submitted and even assuming for the purpose of this 
argument that there may have been a misrepresentation, 
it is a question of fact as to whether or not Mr. Hummel 
relied upon it. This is particularly true in view of J\1:r. 
Hummel's statement that he didn't think Mr. Dahl knew 
how many square feet there were in the house, (R.13). 
Certainly, if J\ir. Hu1nn1el is permitted to vary thP, 
terms of the written contract (Exhibit D3) attached to 
D's deposition), then it is a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the trier of the fact as to whether or not the 
specifications were to be "approved" by J\![r. Hummel be-
fore the contract became binding. 
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal in order 
to support a Summary Judgn1ent; see You.ng v. Felornia 
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(1952) 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (Cert. denied 344 U.S. 
885); Ulib.arri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 367,275 P. 2d 170; 
Fountain v. Filson (1949) 336 U.S. 681, 61 S. Ct. 754, 93 
L. Ed. 971; Holbrook et ux v. Webster's Inc., et al., 
( 1958) 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P 2d 661. 
The rule of law as to review of a summary judg-
ment is clearly stated in Federal Practice and Procedure, 
by Barren and Holtzoff, Vol. 3, P. 120, as follows: 
"On appeal from a summary judgment, the 
Court appeals should view the facts from a stand-
point most favorable to the appellant and accept 
his allegations of fact as true, and assume a state 
of facts most favorable to him. On appeal from a 
summary judgment, the only question is whether 
the allegations of the party against whom it was 
rendered were sufficient to raise a material or 
genuine issue of fact." 
Courts should only grant Summary Judgment where 
the facts are clear and unequivocal. U.R.C.P. 56 (c) pro-
vides in part as follows: 
". . . The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law ..... " 
Professor Moore in his treatise on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular 
rule: 
"The function of the summary judgment is to 
avoid a useless trial ; and a trial is not only not 
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useless (sic) but absolutely neces~arywhere there 
is a genuine issue as to any material fact. In rul,. 
:vng on a motion for S'ummary judgment the 
court's function is to determine whether such o 
genuine iss1w exists, not to resolve atny factual 
issues." (Moore's- Federal Practice, Vol. 6, · p. 
2101) (Emphasis added) 
"The courts are in entire agreement that the 
moving party for summary judgment has the 
burden of showing the absence of any genuine 
issue as to all the material facts, which, under 
applicable principles of substantive law, entitle 
him to judgment as a matter of law. The courts 
hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy 
his burden the movant must make a showing that 
is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes 
any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine 
issue of material fact. Since it is not the function 
of the trial court to adjudicate genuine factual 
issues at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, in ruling on the motion all inferences 
of fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing 
must be drawn ag.ainst the movant and in favor of 
the party opposing the motion. And the papers 
supporting movant's position are closely scrutin-
ized, while the opposing papers are indulgently 
·treated, in determining whether the movant has 
satisfied his burden. 
"·To satisfy the moving party's burden the 
evidentiary material before the court, if taken 
as true, n1ust establish the absence of any genuine 
issue of material fact, and it must appear that 
there is no real question as to the credibility of the 
evidentiary 1naterial, so that it is to be taken as 
true. If the non-existence of any genuine issue of 
material fact is established by such credible evi-
dence that on the facts and the law the movant is 
entitled to judgn1ent as a 1natter of law, the mo-
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tion ·should be granted, unless the opposing party 
shows good reason why he is at the time of the 
hearing unable to present facts in opposition to 
the motion. If, however, the papers before the 
court disclose a real issue of credibility or, apart 
from credibility, fail to establish clearly that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the 
motion must be denied." (Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Vol. 6, pp. 2133, 2126). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Appellants respectfully request the 
Court to reverse the decision of the Honorable Stewart 
Hanson in awarding a Summary Judgment for the rea-
sons and upon the grounds that there is no clear issue 
of law and fact which would allow the Defendant Peter 
Hummel to rescind the contract and be restored to the 
money that was deposited on the contract. The contract 
is clear and unequivocal and since the Defendant Hummel 
cannot alter or in any way change the terms thereof 
and furthermore because there was no misrepresentation 
or if any misrepresentation is claimed, it is a question of 
fact to be decided by the trier of the fact and not by 
summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN and 
DEAN E. CONDER 
OF NIELSEN and CONDER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellant 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
Attorney for Defendant Dahl 
and Appellant 
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